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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to observe the evolving relationship of mutual trust and 
fundamental rights in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of the 
European Union (EU). The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has long prioritized the 
effectiveness of instruments based on mutual trust through an unimpeded system of 
mutual recognition. Arguments based on a violation of fundamental rights were 
understood by the CJEU as contradicting the presumption of compliance, refuting 
mutual trust, and, subsequently, hindering the automaticity of mutual recognition. 
However, the CJEU has now accepted, both in criminal and asylum law, that the 
presumption of compliance should not be conclusive, that mutual trust is not blind 
and mutual recognition should not be absolute, where it specifically prescribes so. 
Rights are arguably now being taken seriously. The article observes an emergent, but 
carefully controlled dynamic of rights-based assessment through case-by-case analysis 
by illustrating three phases of mutual trust. However, the article argues that this 
dynamic is slow, unclear and inadequate. It suggests that national authorities should 
take a proactive role, promoting real and constructive relationships of trust and 
allowing an individual assessment of rights violations via exercising a rights-based 
review. The latter is based on a proper understanding of trust, as an evolving concept 
based on evidence. Respect for rights, terminological clarity, enhanced judicial 
communication, and acknowledgment of shared values are the way forward for the 
unchartered territory of mutual trust.  
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 5 
Introduction 
According to the principle of mutual recognition, Member States recognize each 
other’s rules and cooperate without the need to set any additional checks and 
guarantees. The foundation of mutual recognition relies on a high level of mutual trust 
between Member States, accepting that ‘while another Member State may not deal 
with a certain matter in the same or even a similar way as one’s own state, the results 
will be such that they are accepted as equivalent to decisions by one’s own state’.1 
Mutual trust, in its turn, is founded on a presumption of compliance with rules on the 
protection of fundamental rights which are commonly accepted by Member States, 
offering a common denominator that renders different approaches equivalent.  
Mutual trust constitutes the basis for several instruments of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ).2 For example, under the Framework Decision on the 
European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW), a European arrest warrant (EAW) is a judicial 
decision issued by one Member State and transmitted to another, in order to arrest 
and surrender a person for the purpose of his prosecution, or for the execution of a 
sentence or a detention order.3 Another notable measure, operating on the basis of 
mutual trust, is the Dublin III Regulation concerning the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged by a third-country national.4 One Member State is identified as being 
responsible, while the rest trust that the treatment of asylum seekers satisfies their 
obligations to respect fundamental rights in light of their participation in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in the Geneva Convention.5  
Against this background, the Court developed the doctrine of mutual trust, that has 
been understood as a duty rather than as a social construct that needs to be 
determined. Arguments based on rights violations have generally been dismissed by 
                                                          
1 COM(2000)495 Final, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament; Mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal matters”. 
2 To name but a few, Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the 
application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to 
decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, O.J. 2009, L 294/20; 
Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, O.J. 2002, L 190/1 (as amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 Feb. 2009, O.J. 2009, L 81/24); Directive 2011/99/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European protection order, O.J. 2011, L 
338/2.  
3 FDEAW op. cit. supra note 2, Arts 1(1), 9(1), 10. Judicial cooperating authorities trust each other 
enough to function in strict time-limits and without many formalities. See, Art 1(2), 15(1), 17. 
4 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining 
an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person (recast) (Dublin III), O.J. 2013, L 180/31. 
5 Convention (IV) relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war (Geneva, 12 August 1949); 
Dublin III, op. cit. supra note 4, Preamble, Recital 3. 
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the Court as disputing the duty of presuming compliance, shattering the premise of 
trust and effectively hindering cooperation. Still, with particular reference to asylum 
law, the presumption of compliance was rebutted early on, but, in the field of the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW),6 the Court has been 
timid in recognizing limits to the doctrine of mutual trust. The nexus between rights 
and trust, though, is far from clear, while remaining challenges exist.  
Lots of ink had already been spilt on the relationship between mutual trust and 
fundamental rights before the ground-breaking judgment in Aranyosi.7 To date, and 
after the latter judgment, the problem has also received some attention in the research 
literature.8 However, a systematic, holistic understanding of how relevant, recent 
developments, after Aranyosi, could contribute to the evolution of trust, is now 
needed. This article analyses the development of case law on the FDEAW and the 
Dublin III Regulation, and evaluates how the notion of trust has evolved from the 
perspective of protecting fundamental rights through three distinct phases. It 
specifically focuses on the unchartered territory of mutual trust in the nascent phase 
of recent, rights-oriented case law of the Court. It observes that while we are still in a 
phase of carefully controlled derogations as far as the FDEAW is concerned, we have 
now slowly been moving towards a phase of an emergent individual assessment as far 
as the Dublin III Regulation is concerned.  
The article argues that the presumption of compliance which mutual trust is relied 
upon, may be rebutted whenever there is a strong, convincing argument suggesting 
actual lack of compliance with fundamental rights law. Against this framing argument 
of fundamentally reconsidering the doctrine of mutual trust, the article contributes to 
the understanding of the principle with a focus on the unchartered territory beyond 
‘blind trust’. It specifically suggests and discusses several elements that could be key 
to the evolution of mutual trust which are respect to rights, terminological clarity, 
enhanced communication and strengthening shared values. It is argued that we need 
to clarify our terminology when discussing trust and recognition, understanding their 
linear relationship. In light of this, respect for fundamental rights should be translated 
                                                          
6 FDEAW op. cit. supra note 2. 
7 For recent contributions see, inter alia, Bribosia and Weyembergh, “Confiance mutuelle et droits 
fondamentaux: «Back to the future»”, (2016) CDE, 480; Mitsilegas, “The limits of mutual trust in 
Europe’s area of freedom, security and justice: From automatic inter-state cooperation to the slow 
emergence of the individual”, 31 YEL (2012), 319; Larsen, “Some reflections on mutual recognition in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” in Cardonnel, Rosas and Wahl (Eds.), Constitutionalising 
the EU Judicial System: Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
8 Lenaerts, “La vie après l’avis: exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust”, 54 CML Rev. 
(2017), 805-840; Anagnostaras, “Mutual confidence is not blind trust! Fundamental rights protection 
and the execution of the European arrest warrant: Aranyosi and Caldararu”, 53 CML Rev. (2016), 1675–
1704; Hong, “Human dignity, identity review of the European arrest warrant and the Court of Justice 
as a listener in the dialogue of courts: Solange-III and Aranyosi”, 12 EuConst (2016), 549-563; 
Wischmeyer, “Generating trust through law? Judicial cooperation in the European Union and the 
“principle of mutual trust”, 17(3) GLJ (2016), 339-382. 
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into limiting the doctrine of mutual trust even in light of breaches of other rights than 
prohibition of torture. Additionally, the encouragement of national authorities to 
engage in an active dialogue and communication is extremely significant from the 
perspective of building real trust, which does not rely on presumptions but on 
knowledge built by evidence. Knowledge can be gained through mutual learning. 
Lastly, trust requires the existence of shared values, which need to be acknowledged, 
celebrated and reinforced though harmonization of areas which have been diversely 
regulated but are based on such shared values.   
The FDEAW and the Dublin III Regulation are specifically discussed by the article for 
a number of factors, which enable a holistic discussion on mutual trust. First, on the 
one hand, the FDEAW is the exemplary measure of mutual recognition, and the Dublin 
III Regulation is the one facing many fundamental problems and raising skepticism. 
Second, the FDEAW is an example of positive mutual recognition whereby Member 
States recognize each other’s decision based on which they have to surrender an 
individual. On the other hand, the Dublin III Regulation is based on negative mutual 
recognition, which means that Member States recognize the responsibility of other 
Member States to examine an application and thus escape from the obligation to take 
charge of an applicant.9 They also both entail the physical transfer of individuals, and 
are infamous for fundamental rights implications. Therefore, they offer a great 
combination for comparability but also diversity in the discussion on mutual trust. 
Still, as they represent two fundamentally different areas of EU law, any generic 
conclusions regarding mutual trust should be drawn carefully. 
Three Phases of Evolution 
The article observes three phases in the case law of the CJEU regarding mutual trust 
and rights. These refer to both the FDEAW and the Dublin III Regulation, yet do not 
coincide chronologically. Rather, they refer to qualitative elements of the case law 
regarding mutual trust. The first phase refers to what is identified by the literature as 
‘blind trust’. This is a long phase as far as the FDEAW is concerned, and ended in 2016, 
with the judgment in Aranyosi, whereas, in the context of the Dublin system, it had 
already ended in 2013, with the judgment in N.S. and Others. The second phase has 
therefore started with the above-mentioned judgments. Limits to trust under strict 
conditions, though, are endemic of this second phase. The third phase of case law is 
the one moving towards an individual assessment, where trust is challenged in specific 
cases, but not necessarily because systemic deficiencies exist in the prison or reception 
conditions of a Member State. This nascent phase, which began with C.K. and Others, 
has arguably not started yet for the FDEAW. Although Aranyosi calls for an individual 
assessment, it does not depart from the generic requirement to prove systemic 
deficiencies, which has to be satisfied in the first place. This section demonstrates the 
                                                          
9 On the latter distinction see, Guild, “Seeking asylum; Storm clouds between international 
commitments and EU legislative measures’, 29(2) ELR (2004), 198-218, at 206 
 8 
changing trend and shift from one phase to the other, before putting forward how 
mutual trust should be truly understood.  
The Phase of Blind Trust  
It is evident that the Court’s reasoning in this first and long-standing phase of case law 
on the FDEAW extensively focused on the efficacy of the surrender system, to the 
detriment of fundamental rights. For this reason, insisting on presuming the 
compliance of authorities with rights obligations was deemed necessary to maintain 
the mutual trust between national authorities, which needed to cooperate efficiently 
as a matter of principle. 
During the first phase of case law on the FDEAW, Member States were strictly obliged 
to act upon a EAW and only derogate based on optional or mandatory grounds for 
refusal, which are listed in the FDEAW.10 This had resulted in a rigid regime where 
even the protection of mutual recognition per se was often prioritized and mutual trust 
was not challenged.  In Radu, the Court asserted that respect for fundamental rights 
did not require that the executing authority may refuse to execute a EAW in the event 
of fundamental rights breaches.11 Moreover, the Court in Melloni again protected the 
principle of mutual trust and prioritized the efficacy of the measure against the 
protection of fundamental rights. The Court again, similar to Radu, argued that 
allowing the executing authority to make the surrender of the person convicted in 
absentia conditional upon a subsequent review of the judgment leading to a EAW 
would undermine the efficacy of the measure.12  
Fundamental rights were not given sufficient attention in the field of the Dublin 
system either, and the CJEU was timid, even slow, to recognize exceptions in the 
presumption of mutual trust here too. Although this first phase regarding the Dublin 
system is chronologically different from that concerning the FDEAW, and the 
instruments refer to different areas of law, some careful analogies can be made. The 
law had failed for a long period to move away even slightly from a border-control 
narrative and embrace the humanitarian side of the debate.13 Similar to the area of the 
FDEAW, the Court generally highlighted the state-centric objectives shaping the 
Dublin system at the cost of the protection of fundamental rights. The prevalence of 
the state-centric purpose of the Regulations was noticed both at the legislative and 
                                                          
10 FDEAW op. cit. supra note 2, Arts 3, 4, 4a and 5; Case C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, EU:C:2013:39, 
paras 35, 36; Case C-388/08, PPU Artur Leymann and Aleksei Pustovarov, EU:C:2008:669, para 51; 
Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello, EU:C:2010:683, para 37. 
11 Case C-396/11, Radu, para 39. On a commentary see, Xanthopoulou, “The quest for proportionality 
for the European arrest warrant: Fundamental rights protection in a mutual recognition environment”, 
6(1) New Journal of European Criminal Law (NJECL), 32-52, at 38-45.  
12 Ibid, para 63. 
13 Moreno-Lax, “Life after Lisbon: EU asylum policy as a factor of migration control’, in Acosta Arcarazo 
and Murphy (Eds.), EU Security and Justice Law; After Lisbon and Stockholm, (Hart Publishing, 
2013), p. 149. 
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jurisprudential level.14 The extreme, but not infrequent, case that asylum seekers were 
victims of degrading and inhuman treatment breached their absolute right not to be 
subjected to such treatment, and necessitated to move beyond mutual trust.15 As a 
result, numerous challenges were made in front of national and European courts to 
prevent transfers to Greece in view of worrying reception conditions and inadequate 
human rights protection.16 
The Phase of Controlled Derogations from Mutual Trust 
The second phase had started earlier in the context of the Dublin system than in the 
FDEAW, with the judgment of the Court in N.S. and Others, but remained quite 
narrowly prescribed. The CJEU adopted the M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece ruling17 in 
its N.S. and M.E. judgment and stated that the presumption that asylum seekers will 
be treated in a way that complies with fundamental rights must be regarded as 
rebuttable.18 The judgment in N.S. and Others was seminal in the evolution of the 
concept of mutual trust in the form of a non-conclusive presumption.19 Having opened 
Pandora’s box, the Court then wished to ensure that it remained in control of the limits 
allowed to be set on mutual trust. Abdullahi, therefore, served the purpose of taming 
the limits to trust, reminding Member States of their obligation to trust each other.20 
Abdullahi thus set the tone of this phase of case law, where the Court clearly delineates 
the discretion of authorities regarding the scope of review.  
                                                          
14 Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 7, at 334. 
15 Nanopoulos, “Trust issues and the European common asylum system; Finding the right balance (Case 
comment)”, 72(2) C.L.J. (2013), at 276. 
16 Matera, “The common European asylum system and its shortcomings in protecting human rights: 
Can the notion of human security (help to) fill the gaps?” in Matera and Taylor (Eds.), The Common 
European Asylum System and Human Rights: Enhancing Protection in Times of Emergencies (Asser 
Institute, CLEER, 2014), at 12, 13; Lenart, “Fortress Europe”: Compliance of the Dublin II Regulation 
with the European convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” 28(75) 
Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (2012), 4-19. 
17 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece Appl. No. 30696/0921, judgment of 21 January 2011, paras 
347-350. For a comment see Moreno-Lax. “Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v Belgium and 
Greece”, 14(1) European Journal of Migration and Law (E.J.M.L.) (2012), 1-31. 
18 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and Others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department EU:C:2011:865, para 104. 
19 Buckley, “Case Comment: NS v Secretary of State for the home department”, 2 E.H.L.R. (2012), 205-
210; Den Heijer, “Case Comment: Joined Cases C-411 and C-493/10, NS v Secretary of State for the 
home department and ME v Refugee Applications Commissioner”, 49(5) CML Rev. (2012), 1735-1754. 
20 Case C 394/12, Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, EU:C:2013:813. The Court held, that an 
applicant may only challenge a Member State’s decision by claiming systemic deficiencies in the asylum 
procedure, and in the reception conditions which provide substantial grounds for believing that the 
applicant would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
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The same timid tone of controlled derogations from the obligation to trust dominated 
Aranyosi, where the Court, introduced a ground for postponement of the surrender.21 
In this case, the referring court asked whether Article 1(3) of the FDEAW should be 
read in such a way that the executing authority could or should refuse to execute a 
EAW in light of fundamental rights violations and particularly violation of Article 3 of 
the ECHR or Article 4 of the Charter.  The Court held that when the judicial authorities 
have evidence that there is a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, they are bound 
to assess the possible existence of that risk, relying on ‘objective, reliable, precise and 
duly updated elements’.22 The establishment of the fact that such a risk exists is not 
sufficient to allow the executing authority to refuse the execution of a EAW.23 The 
authorities must also establish that the specific person will be exposed to this risk 
specifically because of the conditions of their detention.24 If the executing authority is 
convinced of the existence of this risk for the particular person, it has to postpone, but 
not abandon, the EAW, and make a decision on detention after informing Eurojust.25   
The judgment in Aranyosi reveals the spirit of this phase of case law, which is still 
currently pertinent to the FDEAW. On the one hand, the Court introduced an 
exception, and, on the other hand, it ensured that the exception is firmly tamed and 
controlled. The judgment makes an attempt to reconcile rights with trust; however, it 
remains loyal to the idea of blind trust to which this judgment constitutes an exception, 
only then to confirm the rule. Particularly, the judgment introduced a high threshold 
for the test to be satisfied. An additional part was specifically added to the test that had 
been introduced by N.S. and Others, referring to ‘systemic deficiencies’ of reception 
conditions or asylum procedures. That is a generic test and refers to systemic 
deficiencies in a state which have been well-documented. On the other hand, Aranyosi 
requires a double test to be satisfied. First, a real risk has to be established, similar to 
N.S. and Others, that the requested person would be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter, due to the issuing state’s 
prison conditions which suffer from systemic flaws. So far, the test follows the generic 
test introduced by N.S. and Others. However, the second layer of the test essentially 
intensifies the review. Apart from identifying systemic deficiencies to establish the 
risk, the executing authorities must determine that such a risk exists in the particular 
case examined. They have to conduct an individual assessment in concreto in the case 
of the requested person. 
 
                                                          
21 Joint Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15, PPU Pal Aranyosi and Robert Caldararu, EU:C:2016:198. 
22 Ibid, para 88. 
23 Ibid, para 91. 
24 Ibid, paras 92-94. 
25 Ibid, paras, 98, 100-102.  
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It remains to be seen what the future of mutual trust will be for the FDEAW, but 
Aranyosi has at least introduced the ruling that an individual assessment is necessary 
to determine actual compliance with the obligation to respect rights as the basis of 
trust. It could be argued that although Aranyosi still insists on the same 
understanding of mutual trust as a legal obligation, it paves the way to the third phase 
of evolution. 
Towards a Phase of Individual Assessment?  
The third phase that can be identified in case law embraces a more extensive rights 
review, in the context of asylum law, while departing from the narrow scope of 
Abdullahi and the ‘systemic deficiencies’ test of N.S. and Others. Trust, here, is earned 
on a basis of a case-by-case analysis, when the presumption is challenged. Individual 
circumstances are carefully considered, and individuals’ human dignity is placed at 
the center of the judicial reasoning. Although the FDEAW has not yet ‘entered’ this 
phase – and it is doubtful that it will do soon, given the strictness of the test in 
Aranyosi – the evolution of trust in asylum law is paradigmatic, as the article argues 
in the next section.  
In particular, it appears that the Court in Ghezelbash decided contra Abdullahi. The 
Court clarified that Article 4 of the Dublin III Regulation confers a right to the asylum 
seeker to be informed of the criteria for determining the Member State responsible. 
The ruling was upheld in the subsequent case of Karim that reiterated that Article 
27(1) of the Dublin III Regulation grants an asylum seeker an effective remedy against 
a transfer decision, which may concern the examination of the application of that 
Regulation.26 Therefore, the judgment moved away from the narrow interpretation of 
the Dublin III Regulation in Abdullahi, that an asylum seeker could only challenge 
their transfer where it was feared that they would be subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  
Furthermore, another seminal judgment in the context of asylum law which informs 
the interdependent relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights is C.K. 
and Others,27 where the Court moved away from the systemic deficiencies 
requirement. The question submitted to the Court was whether the assessment of 
circumstances under Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation is sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter in cases where no 
systemic flaws exist. The CJEU stated that according to the case law of the ECtHR28 
the suffering which stems from naturally occurring illness may be covered by Article 3 
ECHR, wherever it is, or there is a risk that it will be, aggravated by treatment as a 
                                                          
26 Case C‑155/15, George Karim v Migrationsverket, EU:C:2016:410. 
27 Case C‑578/16 PPU, C. K., H. F., A. S. v Republika Slovenija, EU:C:2017:127.  
28 ECtHR, Paposhvili v. Belgium, no. 41738/10, judgment of 12 December 2016. 
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result of detention conditions, expulsion, or other measures which can be attributed 
to the authorities. The Court held that even where there are no serious grounds for 
believing that there are systemic failures in the asylum procedure and the reception 
conditions of asylum seekers, a transfer in itself can entail a real risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter. This is particularly the 
case where the transfer of an asylum seeker suffering from a serious mental or physical 
condition leads to their significantly worsening health. 
The authorities of a Member State must consider objective factors, such as medical 
evidence, which prove the particular seriousness of a person’s condition and the 
serious and irremediable impact that a transfer may entail for that person. These 
authorities would have to eliminate any serious doubt concerning the impact of the 
transfer on the status of the person concerned. They can do so by ensuring that the 
applicant is accompanied, during the transfer, by the appropriate medical staff, to 
prevent any deterioration in their health.29 If necessary, a Member State should 
suspend the transfer for as long as the applicant’s health condition does not allow them 
to be subject to a transfer. The requesting Member State may also choose to examine 
the request itself by making use of the ‘discretionary clause’ under Article 17(1) Dublin 
III. That provision should still be read as offering discretion to the Member State, 
rather than obliging them to exercise responsibility.30 
The last judgment is very important, as it allows space for assessing the individual case 
based on the evidence that the individual submits, beyond a discourse of preserving 
mutual trust whilst assessing the damning effect of a transfer for an individual. 
Although the judgment only refers to inhuman or degrading treatment, it points to a 
way forward where a case-by-case analysis could be developed in line with the case law 
of the ECtHR. The judgment empowers the authorities to perform an individual 
assessment, with compassion, beyond a narrative of trust by finally prioritizing the 
individual situation of a human being in a vulnerable position, and based on medical 
evidence.  
Reasons of the trajectory 
One might wonder why the relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights 
has gone through these evolutionary changes in the case law of the CJEU in the two 
different fields of EU asylum and criminal law. A discussion on the reasons why this 
has taken place should first consider the two fields separately, as the changes have not 
occurred at the same time. The noticeable shift in the case law on the FDEAW, as well 
as the place of Aranyosi in the wider discourse on EU fundamental rights,31 has been 
                                                          
29 Case C‑578/16 C.K. and Others, paras 80, 81, 82. 
30 Ibid, paras 87, 88, 89. 
31 Hong, op. cit. supra note 8. 
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analyzed by commentators.32 Scholars notice that the Court, having established the 
effectiveness of the FDEAW, decided to attend to the growing concerns over rights. 
The Court first chose to ensure the functionality of the FDEAW, via ensuring an 
unimpeded system of mutual recognition, asserting its authority on national judicial 
authorities, and then moved on responding to the growing concerns about rights. This 
could also resonate with the Court’s deliberate decision to make a statement that 
fundamental rights are not neglected.33  
As far as the case law on the Dublin III Regulation is concerned, the shift both in N.S. 
and Others and recently in C.K. and Others, despite being long-overdue, is a positive 
and welcome change and signifies a process of maturity for the principle of mutual 
trust in Dublin system. It recognized what had long been obvious with regard to 
endemic problems of the asylum system for vulnerable individuals, leading to systemic 
deficiencies and the gross fundamental rights violations of the applicants. The Court 
was ‘forced’, in view of the serious circumstances, to re-evaluate the concept of mutual 
trust resulting in transfers without checks. 
A reason that might explain this change of direction in both fields could be the Court’s 
willingness to compromise on the position of exceptionalism that was put forward by 
the CJEU in its recent Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the EU to the ECHR.34 In this 
Opinion, the Court offered a detailed legal analysis of the Draft Accession Agreement 
of the EU to the ECHR to ascertain the compliance of this agreement with EU law.35 
There, the Court specified that accession cannot impact upon mutual trust in AFSJ 
matters, and highlighted the need to protect the principle of mutual trust. However, 
in a number of more recent cases in the context of the FDEAW the Court appeared to 
adopt a rights-oriented approach, demonstrating an extra care for rights.36 Perhaps, 
the Court, having now asserted this position of authority and autonomy of EU law, has 
                                                          
32 For an analysis of the ruling see, Anagnostaras, op. cit. supra note 8; Gáspár-Szilágyi, “Case Report, 
‘Joined Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging human rights standards, mutual trust and a new 
ground for postponing a European arrest warrant” 24 European Journal of Crime, Criminal law and 
Criminal Justice (Eur.J.Crime Cr.L.Cr.J.) (2016), 197-219; Ballegooij and Bárd, “Mutual recognition 
and individual rights: Did the Court get it right?’ (2016) 23 (4) New Journal of European Criminal Law 
(NJECL) 439-464. 
33 Anagnostaras, op. cit. supra note 8, 1698 
34 Peers, “Human rights and the European arrest warrant: Has the ECJ turned from poacher to 
gamekeeper?’ (EU Law Analysis, 12 November 2016) < 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/11/human-rights-and-european-arrest.html> (last visited 
15 Sept. 2017). 
35 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 18 Dec. 2014, EU:C:2014:2454. 
36 Case C-237/15 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Francis Lanigan, EU:C:2015:474; C-294/16 
PPU, JZ v Prokuratura Rejonowa Łódź – Śródmieście, EU:C:2016:610; Case C‑241/15, Niculaie Aurel 
Bob-Dogi, EU:C:2016:385; C-108/16 PPU, Paweł Dworzecki, EU:C:2016:346; C-453/16 PPU Halil 
Ibrahim Özçelik, EU:C:2016:860; Case C‑452/16 PPU, Krzystof Marek Poltorak, EU:C:2016:858; Case 
C‑477/16 PPU, Ruslanas Kovalkovas EU:C:2016:861. 
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started developing a rights-sensitive approach, in its own terms, without being 
instructed by another Court. Aranyosi and C.K. and Others belong perhaps to this 
conscious effort of autonomously developing a rights-narrative in the case law, after 
having ensured the efficiency as well as the autonomy of EU law.  If the above analysis 
on explaining the Court’s changing approach is correct, one wonders whether the law 
in this area is governed by constitutional values or by circumstantial pressures flowing 
from its interaction with other courts and the conflicting need to remain autonomous. 
The Way Forward through Unchartered Territory  
The article claims that the attempt at reconciliation of rights and trust in Aranyosi and 
then C.K. and Others, although welcome, is still inadequate and submits a 
fundamental reconsideration of the concept of mutual trust. This reconsideration is 
based on a quest for clarity in terminology and conceptual distinctions. Trust cannot 
be enclosed to a static obligation but should be understood as a dynamic social 
construct that is not enforceable itself, unlike mutual recognition. In light of this 
framing argument, the article argues that the last phase of the doctrine’s evolution 
moving towards an individual assessment, when this is necessary, is welcome but 
should be further developed in relation to other occasions that have not been clarified. 
The article particularly argues first that respect for all fundamental rights is essential, 
as disrespect for rights is evidently what has so far caused distrust among authorities 
of Member States. In this respect, acknowledging shared values and the need for 
strengthening them via harmonization is also essential. Finally, in order for authorities 
to trust each other, communication, learning and mutual understanding are 
necessary.  
Reconsidering Trust   
Despite the noticeable shift in the judicial attitude, the overarching value of the 
protection of fundamental rights within the framework of mutual trust is not yet fully 
recognized. This is because of not having properly conceptualized trust in our legal 
framework which impacts on fundamental rights. The problematic relationship 
between mutual trust and fundamental rights has been further anchored to the 
terminological vagueness stemming from and feeding to the cognitive dissonance in 
relation to these terms. The two terms, trust and recognition, are often used 
interchangeably without a clear understanding of their role in the system of 
cooperation. Therefore, the article argues that the discourse on mutual trust and 
mutual recognition requires terminological clarity and perceptive change in relation 
to truly understanding the terms that are central to transfers of individuals in the 
AFSJ, based on this framework of recognition and trust.  
First of all, it is helpful to set out where the misconception lies. We know that mutual 
recognition requires mutual trust. However, the whole concept of mutual trust is 
supposedly based on a presumption of compliance. This is problematic as it relies on 
a pure leap of faith. Instead of Member States gaining trust and becoming 
trustworthy via actual and evidenced compliance with rules, they presume that every 
cooperating party complies with these rules. A mere presumption is therefore the 
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premise that such an important relationship relies on, which essentially skips the step 
of gaining trust and becoming trustworthy. The relationship of cooperation among 
states is based only on a choice of presuming in almost religious, dogmatic terms. The 
presumption though could be challenged once a truthful, logical argument appears.  
Referring to trust as a static construct and a legal obligation is also wrong, as it 
prolongs the cognitive dissonance that feeds to its misrecognition as a changing social 
concept that needs evidence to be established. For example, Advocate General Bot 
opined in Aranyosi that a ground for non-execution because of a risk of violation of 
fundamental rights in the issuing Member States, would substantially undermine the 
relationship of trust between Member State.37 This is an example of where our 
narrative wrongly lies on a premise that trust is a static construct that is well-protected 
by the law. Here, assuming that the legal interpretation itself would have a damning 
effect on trust is wrong, as it fails to recognize the real nature of the concept is not 
enforceable. Trust cannot be enforced unlike mutual recognition that can be the 
subject of a legal provision. Trust can also be undermined even without changing the 
interpretation of the FDEAW, if Member States are not trustworthy. 
Another example could also be helpful. The Court stated in Aranyosi that the FDEAW 
established a system of arrest and surrender with the purpose ‘to facilitate and 
accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the objective set for the 
European Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice, founded on the 
high level of confidence which should exist between the Member States’.38 Again, here, 
trust is treated as a legal obligation of Member States which should trust each other 
again as if trust can be automatically generated and maintained without a constant 
effort of being trustworthy. So, the misconception lies on missing the fact that trust, 
as firm belief, is the result of a continuous effort and that it can actually be undermined 
and deconstructed not by allowing the Member States to second-guess each other but 
by actually not proving trustworthiness.  
Therefore, the way forward for mutual trust should involve a process of reflection, 
understanding, and terminological clarity, along with a re-evaluation of the 
relationship between presumptions, trust, trustworthiness, recognition and faith. 
Trust, as the basis of recognition and as a result of evidence, should be earned and 
realistically constructed, as Mitsilegas points out.39 So, the focus of the debate should 
be on how to earn trust in order to become trustworthy. The answer is definitely not 
through presumptions which are compelled by an authority. It is naïve to believe that 
Member States will act in a way in which they will always respect fundamental rights. 
In this case, an obligation to trust could be even harmful.  
                                                          
37 Aranyosi and Caldararu, Opinion, paras 106-122.  
38 Aranyosi and Caldararu, para 77.  
39 Mitsilegas, ‘The symbiotic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in Europe's Area 
of criminal justice’, 6(4) New Journal of European Criminal Law (NJECL) (2015), 457-480.  
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Trust can be earned through knowledge, evidence, repeated patterns, practices and 
interaction.40 This will be achieved through enhanced judicial dialogue: learning from 
the ‘better’ but also from the mistakes of the ‘weaker’, and reflecting on these mistakes. 
This process of being other-regarding in this relationship of cooperation, thereby 
enabling mutual learning,41 also requires the limitation of attitudes of exceptionalism 
in European judiciaries. Adopting a stance of exceptionalism, and labelling states’ 
justice systems as having systemic faults, as if the identification of scapegoats will save 
the mechanism from the burden of other infringements, will certainly not help to 
foster a dialogue and a process of mutual learning based on equal terms. 
Moreover, multiple phases of cooperation based on trust among the respective parties 
could exist. These could range from unconditional acceptance to refusal to cooperate 
because the level of trust is not adequate in view of specific exceptional circumstances. 
However, many other options could be formulated in between these two extremes, 
based on a trans-judicial dialogue. This could entail offering guarantees. A 
proportionality-based analysis is one step in this direction, as it urges judicial 
authorities to investigate such parameters. A proportionality-based analysis would 
determine whether a restriction on a right associated with a transfer is 
disproportionate enough to prevent the transfer.  
This model of trust would also fit into an active model of mutual recognition, in the 
context of which national authorities would communicate with each other. In the 
context of AFSJ, we can currently notice a situation of ‘pure mutual recognition’, as it 
would be called by Nicolaidis and Schmidt when referring to the context of the internal 
market.42 In particular, the application of mutual recognition to the context of the 
FDEAW is what has been described by Armstrong as passive.43 Passive mutual 
recognition accounts for the mere execution of ‘symbolic forms’, such as judicial 
decisions, certificates or qualifications, which are not examined in depth in order to 
ascertain their functional equivalence. However, it was early recognized that generally 
associating the principle of mutual recognition with an absolute home-state model, 
where the host state has to accept every decision of the home state, is misleading.44 In 
light of this, mutual recognition should should not impose a blind obligation to trust 
on the host Member State. It should actually bridge host state and home state control 
                                                          
40 On trust as a social construct see, Willems, ‘Mutual trust as a term of art in EU criminal law: Revealing 
its hybrid character’, 9(1) E.J.L.S (2016), 211-249, at 234-241. 
41 Armstrong, ‘Mutual recognition’, in Barnard and Scott (Eds.), The Law of the Single European 
Market: Unpacking the Premises, (Hart Publishing, 2002), at 233, 241-242.  
42  Nicolaidis and Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition ‘on trial’: The long road to services liberalisation’, 14(5) 
Journal of European Public Policy (J.E.P.P.) (2007), 717-734. 
43 The application of the principle of mutual recognition is further distinguished with regard to internal 
market in passive and active senses. See Armstrong, op. cit. supra note 41, at 242. 
44 Maduro, We, the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, 
(Hart Publishing, 1998) pp. 126-127. 
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‘under conditions of regulatory pluralism’,45 where authorities are encouraged to 
communicate to ensure equivalences. In light of such an active model of mutual 
recognition, mutual trust is generated by a thorough search for equivalences between 
the home-state rule and the host-state one.46 
In Aranyosi, the Court held that the issuing authority must cooperate as a matter of 
emergency and send any information needed to each other.47 For authorities to earn 
trust, they must first need to be trusted, in the sense of allowing them discretion to 
prove their trustworthiness via judicial dialogue and interactive communication. 
Horizontal trust – that between national authorities requires vertical trust – that 
between the Court and the authorities. The latter need to be trusted and empowered 
to exercise rights-based reviews of cases where there is a substantiated argument. If 
they are not trusted by the Court, they will not have the chance to prove their 
trustworthiness to their peer judicial authorities at the horizontal level. If they are 
enabled to do so, they will become other-regarding, grow their trustworthiness, and 
finally earn trust.  
Negating Trust  
Considering this argument in tandem with the shift to a phase where an individual 
assessment of the individual’s situation should be conducted, one wonders whether 
this defeats the purpose of the doctrine and negates the very meaning of mutual trust. 
The question here is how far we can go with accepting limitations to mutual trust, in 
light of fundamental rights violations, as this could eventually destroy the very premise 
of mutual trust.48 According to the Court, a strict threshold should be maintained that 
pertains only to systemic violations with reference to Article 4 of the Charter. President 
Lenaerts specifically suggests that judicial authorities should not second-guess each 
other, unless a substantiated argument is presented to them.49  
However, the article argues that the suggestion of a strict threshold of ‘qualified 
mutual trust’ is conceptually flawed. Asking how much mutual trust could be limited 
to protect fundamental rights without contesting the very premise of mutual trust is a 
paradox. Aspiring to preserve a faulty premise to the detriment of another 
fundamental value is meaningless, and attention should be set on how to fix the first. 
Moreover, any discussion about the limits on mutual trust must take place in light of 
                                                          
45 Ibid, at 231. 
46 See Pelkmans, “Mutual recognition in goods. On promises and disillusions”, 14(5) Journal of 
European Public Policy (J.E.P.P) (2007), 699-716; Trachtman, “Embedding mutual recognition at the 
WTO”, 14(5) Journal of European Public Policy (J.E.P.P.) (2007), 780-799; Nicolaidis and Schmidt, op. 
cit. supra note 42, at 717. 
47 Joint Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15, Aranyosi and Caldararu, para 95. 
48 Mitsilegas, op. cit. supra note 7, at 362; Costello, “Courting Access to Asylum in Europe:  
Recent Supranational Jurisprudence Explored”, (2012) 12 HRLR, 287-339. 
49 Lenaerts, op. cit. supra note 8, at 838. 
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a clear priority in any hierarchy of implicated constitutional values. Accepting a strict 
threshold is wrong from a perspective of properly prioritized values. The need to 
protect the principle of mutual recognition by setting a strict threshold must not 
render the protection of fundamental rights meaningless. The centrality of the 
protection of fundamental rights in EU law should not be disregarded, but instead 
must inform the operation of mutual recognition.  
Accepting judicial limitations to an obligation to trust arguably negates the framework 
of mutual trust itself, as it has been understood so far. This is unavoidable but merely 
reflects the recognition of a process that is already taking place. Trust is already 
negated due to evidence that there is a risk of rights violations rather than by the 
empowering discretion to Member States, which merely recognizes the source of 
distrust. Moreover, for the sake of clarity, it is not trust that is negated by enabling an 
individual assessment but the framework of mutual recognition. Therefore, our 
attention should be channeled to the real source of distrust which is the lack of respect 
to fundamental rights.  
Returning to the framing argument and the quest for terminological clarity, mutual 
trust is a state of mind that Member States need if they are to cooperate, with reference 
to a specific situation, rather than a dogmatic principle that should be blindly followed. 
Mutual recognition is the outcome of mutually trusting each other. Its role in the AFSJ 
is to promote cooperation among Member States with different rules without having 
to dispense with legal diversity. As such, it is a method or a means of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters or cooperation in asylum matters. Despite its 
importance, its position in the constitutional mosaic of the AFSJ should not be 
overestimated, to the detriment of the protection of fundamental rights. Rights have a 
long-standing footing in the constitutional architecture of Member States and are the 
actual cornerstone of an EU area of justice based on mutual trust. Actual, proven 
compliance with obligations to respect rights, rather than commanded presumptions 
of compliance, is what will warrant trust. 
Generating Trust 
Respect: Extending Rebuttal of Presumption to Infringements of Other Rights 
In light of this framework, the article argues that trust will be actually strengthened by 
enabling respect to all rights, when this is challenged and despite the negating effect 
to mutual recognition – and in fact not to mutual trust. A derogation from mutual trust 
based on fundamental rights breaches is though only recognized in relation to Article 
4 Charter or Article 3 ECHR. Therefore, in light of these, it does not appear that an 
individual, either in the context of the FDEAW or the Dublin system, may stop their 
transfer based on an infringement of other rights. In particular, a strict reading of 
these judgments does not necessarily allow for other allegations of infringement to be 
reviewed. It is not at all clear whether rebutting the presumption of mutual trust and 
blocking the mutual recognition of judgments could be extended to cases where due 
process rights are infringed.   
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The article argues that rebutting the presumption of compliance and thus limiting 
trust, with the result of ceasing the process should, as a matter of principle, be able to 
extend to other rights. This should apply, as long as it is established that a serious and 
irremediable violation has taken place, or there is a risk of subjecting the requested 
person to such a violation. This argument is based on several grounds: a textual 
ground; a ground based on constitutionalism; and a ground based on the right to 
justification and individual assessment. 
First, the FDEAW refers to fundamental rights both in the Preamble, Recital 10 and in 
Article 1(3), reminding Member States of their obligations to respect all fundamental 
rights. Furthermore, Article 5 of the FDEAW provides particular guarantees that the 
executing state may ask from the issuing state. For example, the execution of the EAW 
may be subject to the condition that the requested person will be given the opportunity 
to apply for a retrial, when the EAW concerns the execution of a sentence or a 
detention order issued based on a judgment imposed in absentia.50 What is more, 
several provisions of the FDEAW provide for specific rights of the requested person.51 
A textual argument would require an executing authority to pay due regard to 
respecting all the rights of the requested person. 
Secondly, a gradual development of European constitutionalism informed by the 
protection of fundamental rights is undoubtedly taking place in the EU constitutional 
legal order. Shaping the AFSJ, though, has added additional layers of discussion to the 
narrative of the EU constitutionalism. For this reason, fundamental rights and 
constitutional principles should play a central role in the development of a 
transnational justice system. As fundamental rights now enjoy a central position in EU 
law,52 their protection should be treated as such in actual and not merely declaratory 
terms. Judicial or other authorities should be able to establish whether a real risk of 
infringement exists, where a well-supported argument is presented to them.  
Finally, an individual assessment is dictated by a constitutional right to judicial 
review53 and a right to justification when an authority’s action restricts a constitutional 
freedom.54 Rawls connected justice to the justification of  governmental action 
through public reasoning.55 This should be taken seriously as a crucial element of 
                                                          
50 FDEAW op. cit. supra note 2, Art. 5(1).  
51 Ibid, Art. 11 on the rights of the requested person; Art. 12 on detention; Art. 13 on consent; Art. 14 on 
hearing. 
52 The Charter acquired the status of primary law following the Treaty of Lisbon, as it is enshrined in 
Art. 6 of the TEU. 
53 On judicial review see for example, Sedley, “Governments, constitutions and judges”, in Richardson 
and Genn (Eds.), Administrative Law and Government Action, (Oxford, 1994). 
54 Herlin-Karnell, Ester et al, ‘Dimensions of justice & justification in EU and transnational contexts’, 
8(1) Trans. L. T. (2017), 1–7. 
55 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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creating a single area of justice with respect to a transnational rule of law, including 
rights and proportionality.56 
In this sense, an individual assessment, including a proportionality based analysis, 
should be ensured, in cases where relative rights are restricted. A proportionality-
based analysis here would act as a shield protecting fundamental rights, and not 
mutual trust, mutual recognition and free movement of decision. National authorities 
must determine whether the restriction is proportionate. If it is not and the transfer of 
an individual destroys the core essence of the right, the authorities should carefully 
consider how to remedy the violation. A proportionality based analysis should apply 
to such circumstances, on a case-by-case basis, so as to establish the degree of the 
violation, and the remediability of it, in light of ECtHR case law.57  For example, an 
individual assessment could be considered when there is strong evidence of a violation 
when an executing authority may refuse to execute a EAW in light of fundamental 
rights breaches, other than degrading and inhuman treatment. 
Investing in Shared Values: Further Harmonization as a Tool for Generating Trust? 
In this respect, recognizing and strengthening shared values would also be a way to 
generate genuine mutual trust. It has earlier been questioned whether the degree of 
mutual trust is adequate to effect mutual recognition.58 This concern is endemic to the 
nature of governance of the principle of mutual recognition. Although judgments cross 
borders without control, fundamental rights remain bound to the legal order of each 
Member State, and are not harmonized to such an extent that the transfer of mutual 
recognition could be absolutely unproblematic.59 The operation of the principle leads 
to an element of extraterritoriality, a ‘journey into the unknown’.60 Differences in the 
protection of fundamental rights among different Member States61 contradict the 
presumption of compliance which generates mutual trust and supports the operation 
of mutual recognition. It was early argued that legal approximation is necessitated, 
either as an alternative or as a complement to mutual recognition, with regard to a 
                                                          
56 Huscroft, Miller and Webber (Eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, 
Reasoning, (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
57 See for a detailed account on proportionality in this respect, Xanthopoulou, Proportionality and 
Mutual Trust in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, (King’s College London, Doctoral Thesis, 
2017) 
58 Alegre and Leaf, “Mutual recognition in European judicial cooperation: A step too far too soon? Case 
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59 Guild, “Crime and the EU’s Constitutional Future in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 10 
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60  Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, 2009), p. 119 
61 Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and The European Court of 
Human Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 3; Konstadinides, “The perils of ‘Europeanisation’ of 
extradition procedures in the EU mutuality, fundamental rights and constitutional guarantees” in Eckes 
and Konstadinides (Eds.), Crime Within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A European Public 
Order, (CUP, 2011). 
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common approach to defendants’ and due process rights.62 Mitsilegas also considers 
the impact that harmonization of national criminal procedural law on individual rights 
has on the evolution of earned and real mutual trust.63  
Critiques of the absence of common EU defence rights, especially following the quick 
adoption of the EAW in the post 9/11 disordered legal environment, led to the adoption 
of a roadmap on procedural rights in 2009.64 A number of instruments have now been 
adopted.65 However, achieving political consensus on the roadmap and actually 
adopting these instruments has been a lengthy process, especially when considered 
vis-à-vis how quickly the FDEAW was adopted. Indeed, strengthening common 
ground via harmony is a method of building trust through actual rather than imposed 
terms. The article argues that harmonization is welcome as long as it is based on 
shared values, by strengthening them and not contradicting them, and only to the 
extent that it does not become intrusive in the sense of destroying the diversity which 
allows the mutual recognition of the discourse of ‘different yet equivalent’. If 
harmonization permeates the whole justice system of Member States, mutual 
recognition becomes pointless and redundant. The principle of mutual recognition 
constitutes a method of governing cooperation, as an alternative to positive 
integration.66 This model relies on compliance only with rules of the producing state, 
while discouraging public intervention by the host state, where the product, worker, 
service, and now judgments enter. It requires Member States to be tolerant and 
receptive to various products or qualifications. It represents the concept of ‘different 
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but equal’.67 It focuses on, and is actually enabled by, commonalities instead of 
differences only as long as a sufficient level of trust exists, setting aside unnecessary 
divisions. Trust can exist as long as the second part of the expression ‘different but 
equal’ holds true. Therefore, harmonization should operate as a supporting 
mechanism, building on already existing shared values, rather than as a mechanism 
that abolishes meaningful differences. 
Conclusion 
The article has critically observed the principle of mutual trust through its three phases 
of evolution, and suggested what the way forward should be. Mutual trust, first as blind 
trust, initially disregarded calls for rebutting the absolute presumption of states’ 
compliance with their obligations in respect to fundamental rights. Mutual trust then 
moved on to a phase of controlled derogations from the presumption of compliance, 
which is still ongoing for the FDEAW. Very recently, in the context of the Dublin 
system, we have witnessed the shift to the most recent phase, that of a nascent 
individual assessment. The article analyzed these phases with reference to the most 
important case law, and critically discussed recent judgments whose impact is still 
undetermined. Next, the article proposed what is needed for the unchartered territory 
beyond blind trust, as there are still undetermined issues in relation to fundamental 
rights. The article argued that the way forward, for cases where trust is challenged, lies 
on a fundamental reconceptualization of mutual trust that should not be seen as a legal 
obligation but as a result of an evidence-based individual assessment. For mutual trust 
to evolve we need terminological and conceptual clarity and clear understanding of the 
nature of mutual trust. Where trust is negated by fundamental rights violations, the 
framework of cooperation will unavoidably be affected too but our focus should be on 
how to re-generate trust. The article has submitted several suggestions on how to 
restore trust through respect to rights. Respect for fundamental rights will be achieved 
through extending the Aranyosi test to rights other than Article 4 of the Charter. As 
communication is an essential component between trusting parties, national 
authorities’ communication scope needs to increase. This means that the Court should 
also allow these authorities space to communicate with each other, as is the case with 
Aranyosi. In this way, they will learn from each other, understand their practices, and 
effectively show trustworthiness and gain trust. Finally, mutual trust between different 
parties relies on shared values. For this reason, harmonization should serve to 
strengthen the visibility and our understanding of these common values, rather than 
as a mechanism that shatters differences.  
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